Publications

Journal: Philosophy of AI

We are responsible for the journal Philosophy of AI, which is published by the Society for the Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence and founded by PAIR members and associate members. Editors-in-chief: Guido Löhr & Vincent C. Müller. Editorial assistant: Eleonora Catena.

Publications

Forthcoming/ under contract

Ashby, B. (forthcoming). Let sleeping dogs lie: Stereotype completion and the phenomenology of category recognition. Philosophical Studies. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02268-7
Kirchhoff, M., Kiverstein, J. and Robertson, I. (forthcoming): The Literalist Fallacy and the Free Energy Principle: Model-Building, Scientific Realism, and Instrumentalism, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 76 https://doi.org/10.1086/720861
Müller, V. C. (forthcoming), ‘Deep opacity undermines data protection and explainable artificial intelligence’, in M. Hähnel and R. Müller (eds.), Handbook for Applied Philosophy of AI (London: Wiley).
Müller, V. C. (under contract), Can machines think? Fundamental problems of artificial intelligence (New York: Oxford University Press).
Müller, V. C. (ed.), (under contract), Oxford handbook of the philosophy of artificial intelligence (New York: Oxford University Press)
Müller, V. C., Dewey, A. R., Dung, L., & Löhr, G. (eds.) (forthcoming), Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence: The State of the Art (Synthese Library, Berlin: SpringerNature).
Müller, V. C. and Löhr, G. (forthcoming), Artificial minds, (Cambridge Elements – Philosophy of Mind, ed. Keith Frankish; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Robertson, I. (under contract). AI and Expertise. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

2025

de Weerd, C. R., & Dung, L. (2025). How to live in the moment: The methodology and limitations of evolutionary research on consciousness. Cognitive Science 49(3). https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.70053
Dung, L., & Balg, D. (2025). Right in the feels: Academic philosophy, disappointed students and the big questions of life. Teaching Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.5840/teachphil2025227215
Catena, E., Tummolini, L., & Santucci, V. G. (2025). Human autonomy with AI in the loop. Philosophical Psychology, 1–28. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2024.2448217
Müller, V. C. (2025), ‘Philosophy of AI: A structured overview’, in Nathalie A. Smuha (ed.), Cambridge handbook on the law, ethics and policy of Artificial Intelligence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 40-58.
Müller, V. C. (2025), ‘Total surveillance – everybody watching everybody else’, in Henning Glaser and Pindar Wong (eds.), Governing the Future: Digitalization, Artificial Intelligence, Dataism (London: CRC Press – Routledge).

2024

Andreotta, A.J., & Lundgren. B. (2024). Automated informed consent. Big Data & Society 11 (4), https://doi.org/10.1177/20539517241289439
Balg, D., Bolte, L., Burkard, A., Constantin, J., Dung, L., Gottschalk, J., Gregor-Gehrmann, K., Guntermann, I., Schulz, K. (2024). “Ethische Fragen der Künstlichen Intelligenz” (Interview, Paper). Müller, Vincent C. (ed.), Göttingen: Philovernetzt. https://www.philovernetzt.de/ethische-fragen-der-kuenstlichen-intelligenz/
Caporuscio, C., Fink, S.B. (2024). Epistemic Risk Reduction in Psychedelic-Assisted Therapy. In: Current Topics in Behavioral Neurosciences. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, https://doi.org/10.1007/7854_2024_531
de Weerd, C. R. (2024). A Credence-based Theory-heavy Approach to Non-human Consciousness. Synthese 203, 5. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04539-6
Dewey, A. R. (2024). Balancing the evidential scale for the mental unconscious [commentary]. Philosophical Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2024.2316837
Dewey, A. R. (2024). Anatomy’s role in mechanistic explanations of organism behaviour. Synthese 203, 137. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04534-x
Dung, L. (2024). Is superintelligence necessarily moral? Analysis 84(4), 730–738. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anae033
Dung, L. (2024). The argument for near-term human disempowerment through AI. AI & Society. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-024-01930-2
Dung, L. (2024). Evaluating approaches for reducing catastrophic risks from AI. AI and Ethics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43681-024-00475-w
Dung, L. (2024). Understanding artificial agency. The Philosophical Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqae010
Dung, L. (2024). Preserving the normative significance of sentience. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 31(1–2), 8–30. https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.1.008
Dung, L., & Kersten, L. (2024). Implementing artificial consciousness. Mind & Language 40(1), 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12532
Fink, S. B. (2024). On Acid Empiricism. In: The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophy and Psychoactive Drug Use (pp. 225-244). Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland.
Fink, S. B. (2024). How-tests for consciousness and direct neurophenomenal structuralism. Frontiers in Psychology 15. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1352272
Hutto, D. D., & Robertson, I. (2024). What Comes Naturally?: Relaxed Naturalism’s New Philosophy of Nature. In Naturalism and Its Challenges (pp. 19-35). Routledge. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003430568-2/comes-naturally-daniel-hutto-ian-robertson
Lundgren, B. (2024), There is No Scarcity Problem. Philosophy & Technology 37, 130. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-024-00815-y
Lundgren, B. (2024). Is a Moral Right to Privacy Limited by Agents’ Lack of Epistemic Control? Logos & Episteme 15(1): 83-87. https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20241516
Lundgren, B. (2024). A new standard for accident simulations for self-driving vehicles: Can we use Waymo’s results from accident simulations? AI & Society 39: 669–673. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-022-01495-y
Lundgren, B. (2024). Undisruptable or stable concepts: Can we design concepts that can avoid conceptual disruption, normative critique, and counterexamples? Ethics and Information Technology 26, 33. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-024-09767-5
Lundgren, B., & Kudlek, K. (2024). What we owe (to) the present: Normative and practical challenges for strong longtermism. Futures 164, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2024.103471
Lundgren, B., Catena, E., Robertson, I. Hellrigel-Holderbaum, M., Jaja, I.R., & Dung, L. (2024). On the need for a Global AI ethics. Journal of Global Ethics (RJGE). https://doi.org/10.1080/17449626.2024.2425366
Müller, V. C. (2024), ‘Philosophie der Künstlichen Intelligenz: Ein strukturierter Überblick’, trans. Matthias Kettner, in Rainer Adolphi, et al. (eds.), Philosophische Digitalisierungsforschung: Verantwortung, Verständigung, Vernunft, Macht (Bielefeld: transcript Verlag), 345-70.
Müller, V. C. and Hähnel, M.(2024), Was ist, was kann, was soll KI? Ein philosophisches Gespräch (Blaue Reihe; Hamburg: Felix Meiner).
Porter, Ronald D./Shen, Minquian/Fabrigar, Leandre R./Seaboyer, Anthony (2024): Assessing Influence in Target Audiences that Won’t Say or Don’t Know How Much They Have Been Influenced. In: Éric Ouellet (Ed): Deterrence in the 21st Century: Statecraft in the information environment, University of Calgary Press, 36p.
https://ucp.manifoldapp.org/read/deterrence-in-the-21st-century/section/097612c2-2005-4d56-b195-f2e418377755#_idParaDest-26
Repantis, D., Koslowski, M. & Fink, S.B. (2024) Ethische Aspekte der Therapie mit Psychedelika. Psychotherapie 69, 115–121. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00278-024-00710-z
Robertson, I. (2024). A Problem for Autonomous Know-How. Erkenntnis, 1-9.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-024-00849-w
Robertson, I. G. (2024). In Defence of Radically Enactive Imagination. Thought 11(4). https://doi.org/10.5840/tht202421525
Seaboyer, Anthony/Jolicoeur, Pierre (2024): L’intelligence artificielle russe comme outil de désinformation et de déception en Ukraine. In: Frédéric Côté et André Simonyi (Ed), Le Canada à l’aune du conflit en Ukraine, Québec. University of Laval Press. Link.
Seaboyer, Anthony/Jolicoeur, Pierre (2024): The Evolution of China’s Information Exploitation of COVID-19. In: Éric Ouellet (Ed): Deterrence in the 21st Century: Statecraft in the information environment, University of Calgary Press, 28p. Link.

2023

Dung, L. (2023). Tests of animal consciousness are tests of machine consciousness. Erkenntnis. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00753-9
Dung, L. (2023). Current cases of AI misalignment and their implications for future risks. Synthese, 202(5), 138. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04367-0
Dung, L. (2023). How to deal with risks of AI suffering. Inquiry, 1–29. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2023.2238287
Hopster, J., Brey, P., Klenk, M., Löhr, G., Marchiori, S., Lundgren, B., Scharp, K. (2023). Conceptual Disruption and the Ethics of Technology. In van de Poel, I. et al. (eds.) Ethics of Socially Disruptive Technologies: An Introduction. Open Book Publishers, pp. 141–162.
Lundgren, B. and Stefánsson, H. O. (2023). Can the normic de minimis decision theory save the de minimis principle? Erkenntnis. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00751-x
Lundgren, B. (2023). Ethical requirements for digital systems for contact tracing in pandemics: a solution to the contextual limits of ethical guidelines. In Macnish, K., Henschke, A. (eds.) The Ethics of Surveillance in Times of Emergency. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 169–185.
Lundgren, B. (2023). Should we allow for the possibility of unexercised abilities? A new route to rejecting the poss-ability principle. Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2023.2250390.
Lundgren, B. (2023). Is lack of literature engagement a reason for rejecting a paper in philosophy? Res Publica. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-023-09632-0
Lundgren, B. (2023). Two notes on Axiological Futurism: The importance of disagreement and methodological implications for value theory. Futures 147, 103120. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2023.103120.
Lundgren, B. (2023). In defense of ethical guidelines. AI & Ethics  3: 1013–1020. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43681-022-00244-7.
Lundgren, B. (2023). An unrealistic and undesirable alternative to the right to be forgotten. Telecommunications Policy 47(1): 102446. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.telpol.2022.102446.
Robertson, I. (2023) The unbearable rightness of seeing? Conceptualism, enactivism, and skilled engagement. Synthese 202, 173 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04385-y