Publications

“Philosophy of AI”: Journal, Society, Conference Series

The journal Philosophy of AI is published by the Society for Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, which also organises a bi-annual conference on Philosophy of AI (PhAI) – all three are founded and run by PAIR members.

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Forthcoming/under contract

  • Robertson, I. (ed.), (forthcoming). Artificial Intelligence, Cognition and Embodiment. Topical Collection, Synthese.
  • Robertson, I. & Cappuccio, M. (eds.), (forthcoming). ‘Cognition’ section, Dictionary of Sport Psychology 2.0. Elsevier.
  • Fink, S. B. (forthcoming). Structuralism and Neural Correlates of Consciousness. In: Olcese, U., Melloni, L. (eds): The Neuroscience of Consciousness. Springer.
  • Fink, S. B. and Schmidt, T. T. (forthcoming) Altered States of Consciousness. In: Klein, C. (ed.): The Open Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. MIT Press.
  • Fink, S. B. (forthcoming). Sensory Engineering and Epistemic Risks. Philosophy.
  • Müller, V. C. (under contract). Can machines think? Fundamental problems of artificial intelligence. Oxford University Press.
  • Müller, V. C. (ed.), (under contract). Oxford handbook of the philosophy of artificial intelligence. Oxford University Press.
  • Müller, V. C. & Löhr, G. (forthcoming). Artificial minds, Cambridge Elements: Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
  • Müller, V. C., Löhr, G., & Robertson, I. (forthcoming). Philosophy of AI: The state of the art (Proceedings of PhAI 2025). Philosophy of AI.
  • Robertson, I. and Springle, A. (forthcoming). Dumb Like a Fox? Intellectualism and Non-Human Minds. In: Radman, Z. (ed.): The “Animal Turn” Meets Artificial Intelligence. Palgrave Macmillan. 
  • Robertson, I. (under contract). AI and Expertise. Cambridge University Press.
  • Robertson, I. & Gallagher, S. (under contract) Enactivist Approaches to Cognition. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

2026

2025

  • Ashby, B. (2025). Let sleeping dogs lie: stereotype completion and the Phenomenology of category recognition. Philosophical Studies. 182(3), 865-890. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02268-7
  • de Weerd, C. R., & Dung, L. (2025). How to live in the moment: The methodology and limitations of evolutionary research on consciousness. Cognitive Science 49(3). https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.70053
  • Kirkeby-Hinrup, A., Fink, S.B., & Overgaard, Morten S (2025). The multiple generator hypothesis of consciousness. Neuroscience of Consciousness 2025(1), niaf035. https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niaf035
  • Fink, S.B., & Ashby, B (2025). Gastronomy as Sensory Engineering. Gastronomica 25 (3): 69–71. https://doi.org/10.1525/gfc.2025.25.3.69
  • Hellrigel-Holderbaum, M., & Dung, L. (2025). Misalignment or misuse? The AGI alignment tradeoff. Philosophical Studies. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02403-y
  • Lundgren, B. 2025. The Risk of Surveillance Capitalism. Philosophy & Technology 38, 174. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-025-00983-5
  • Lundgren, B. 2025. Review of Norbert Paulo and Lando Kirchmair, Moral Dilemmas Involving Self-Driving Cars: How to Regulate Them and Why Your Opinion Matters (New York: Routledge, 2025), x + 90pp, $37.49. Law and Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-025-09549-0
  • Lundgren, B. (2025). Teaching Trade-offs in a Digital Ethics Course. Teaching Ethics, 24(2), 257–265. https://doi.org/10.5840/tej202579163
  • Lundgren, B. & Stefánsson, H. Orri. (2025). Can the Normic de minimis Expected Utility Theory save the de minimis Principle?. Erkenntnis 90, 1255–1263. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00751-x
  • Lundgren, B. (2025). Can Deepfakes Violate an Individual’s Moral Right to Privacy?. Ethical Theory Moral Practice. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-025-10514-y
  • Lundgren, B. (2025). How social should AI be? Erkenntnis. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-025-01005-8
  • Lundgren, B. On the Limits of the Data Economy: The Case of Autonomous Vehicles. Science and Engineering Ethics 31 (16). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-025-00540-5
  • Lundgren, B. and Stefánsson, H. O. (2025). Can the normic de minimis decision theory save the de minimis principle? Erkenntnis. 90, 1255–1263. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00751-x
  • Lundgren, B. (2025). God and the Possibility of a Moral Right to Privacy. Sophia. 64, 339–344. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-024-01057-3
  • Lundgren, B. (2025). Hobbes’ Ship of Theseus: On the Limits of Surviving a Gradual Replacement of Parts. Theoria. e70013. https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.70013
  • Müller, V. C. (2025). ‘Deep opacity undermines data protection and explainable artificial intelligence’, in M. Hähnel and R. Müller (eds.), Handbook for Applied Philosophy of AI (London: Wiley), 71-81.
  • Müller, V. C. (2025). ‘Philosophy of AI: A structured overview’, in Nathalie A. Smuha (ed.), Cambridge handbook on the law, ethics and policy of Artificial Intelligence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 40-58.
  • Müller, V. C. (2025). ‘Total surveillance – everybody watching everybody else’, in Henning Glaser and Pindar Wong (eds.), Governing the Future: Digitalization, Artificial Intelligence, Dataism (London: CRC Press – Routledge).
  • Naeem, H. (2025). Teaching skills and intellectual virtues with generative AI. Episteme, 1-18. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2025.10089
  • Naeem, H. (2025). AI and the complexity of pain. Philosophy and Technology 38(4), 1-21. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-025-00988-0
  • Robertson, I. (2025). A Problem for Autonomous Know-How. Erkenntnis, 90(4), 1683-1691. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-024-00849-w
  • Robertson, I. (2025) AI, Trust and Reliability. Philosophy & Technology. 38(3). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-025-00924-2
  • Kirchhoff, M., Kiverstein, J. and Robertson, I. (2025): The Literalist Fallacy and the Free Energy Principle: Model-Building, Scientific Realism, and Instrumentalism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 76(3), 000-000. https://doi.org/10.1086/720861

 

2024

2023

  • Dung, L. (2023). Tests of animal consciousness are tests of machine consciousness. Erkenntnis. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00753-9
  • Dung, L. (2023). Current cases of AI misalignment and their implications for future risks. Synthese, 202(5), 138. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04367-0
  • Dung, L. (2023). How to deal with risks of AI suffering. Inquiry, 1–29. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2023.2238287
  • Hopster, J., Brey, P., Klenk, M., Löhr, G., Marchiori, S., Lundgren, B., Scharp, K. (2023). Conceptual Disruption and the Ethics of Technology. In van de Poel, I. et al. (eds.) Ethics of Socially Disruptive Technologies: An Introduction. Open Book Publishers, pp. 141–162.
  • Lundgren, B. (2023). Ethical requirements for digital systems for contact tracing in pandemics: a solution to the contextual limits of ethical guidelines. In Macnish, K., Henschke, A. (eds.) The Ethics of Surveillance in Times of Emergency. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 169–185.
  • Lundgren, B. (2023). Should we allow for the possibility of unexercised abilities? A new route to rejecting the poss-ability principle. Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2023.2250390.
  • Lundgren, B. (2023). Is lack of literature engagement a reason for rejecting a paper in philosophy? Res Publica. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-023-09632-0
  • Lundgren, B. (2023). Two notes on Axiological Futurism: The importance of disagreement and methodological implications for value theory. Futures 147, 103120. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2023.103120.
  • Lundgren, B. (2023). In defense of ethical guidelines. AI & Ethics  3: 1013–1020. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43681-022-00244-7.
  • Lundgren, B. (2023). An unrealistic and undesirable alternative to the right to be forgotten. Telecommunications Policy 47(1): 102446. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.telpol.2022.102446.
  • Robertson, I. (2023) The unbearable rightness of seeing? Conceptualism, enactivism, and skilled engagement. Synthese 202, 173 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04385-y