Publications

Journal & Society: Philosophy of AI

The journal Philosophy of AI is published by the Society for the Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence – both are founded and run by PAIR members and associates.

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Forthcoming/under contract

• Kind, A., Fink, S. B., & Walter, H.(forthcoming). What is Precision Psychotherapy? Journal of Medicine & Philosophy.
• Fink, S. B. (forthcoming). Structuralism and Neural Correlates of Consciousness. In: Olcese, U., Melloni, L. (eds): The Neuroscience of Consciousness. Springer.
• Fink, S. B. and Schmidt, T. T. (forthcoming) Altered States of Consciousness.In: Klein, C. (ed.): The Open Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. MIT Press.
• Fink, S. B. (forthcoming). Sensory Engineering and Epistemic Risks. Philosophy.
• Lundgren, B. (forthcoming). No value alignment without control. AI and Ethics.
• Lundgren, B. & Nuñez-Hernández, N.A. (forthcoming). Is automated therapy dignified Philosophy of AI.
• Müller, V. C. (under contract). Can machines think? Fundamental problems of artificial intelligence (New York: Oxford University Press).
• Müller, V. C. (ed.), (under contract). Oxford handbook of the philosophy of artificial intelligence (New York: Oxford University Press)
• Müller, V. C. & Löhr, G. (forthcoming). Artificial minds, (Cambridge Elements – Philosophy of Mind) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
• Müller, V. C., Löhr, G., & Robertson, I. (forthcoming). Philosohpy of AI: The state of the art. Philosophy of AI (Proceedings of PhAI 2025). 
• Robertson, I. (under contract). AI and Expertise. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Robertson, I. & Gallagher, S. (under contract) Enactivist Approaches to Cognition. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

2026

• Catena, E. AI and human autonomy: a literature review. AI and Ethics 6, 126 (2026). https://doi.org/10.1007/s43681-025-00958-4 
• de Weerd, C. R. (2026). What matters is not what lies dormant beneath: why AI consciousness is not about biological substrates. Synthese, 207(4), 147.
• Jaja, I.R. (2026). Artificially Generated Minorities (AGMs): The Veneer of Algorithmic Bias Correction. In: Gerber, A., Pillay, A.W. (eds): Southern African Conference for Artificial Intelligence Research (SACAIR 2025). Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 2784. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-11733-5_34
• Anderson, J., Hopster, J., and Lundgren, B. 2026. Defining Socially Disruptive Technologies and Reframing the Ethical Challenges They Pose. Technology in Society. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2026.103216.
• Müller, V. C. (2026). ‘Ethics of artificial intelligence and robotics’, vs. 2.0., in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer 2026 edition.
• Müller, V. C. (2026). Short-term or long-term AI ethics? A dilemma for ethical singularity only. In S. Nyholm, A. Kasirzadeh, & J. Zerilli (Eds.), Contemporary debates in the ethics of Artificial Intelligence (pp. 309-318). Wiley.
• Müller, V. C., Dewey, A. R., Dung, L., & Löhr, G. (eds.) (2026). Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence: The State of the Art (Synthese Library, Berlin: SpringerNature).
• Naeem, H. (2026). Integration, epistemic responsibility and seamlessness. In: Bernhard Koch & David Winkler (eds): Artificial Intelligence Ethics in Military Medicine and Humanitarian Healthcare. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-11331-3_10

2025

• Ashby, B. (2025). Let sleeping dogs lie: stereotype completion and the Phenomenology of category recognition. Philosophical Studies. 182(3), 865-890. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02268-7
• Catena, E., Tummolini, L., & Santucci, V. G. (2025). Human autonomy with AI in the loop. Philosophical Psychology, 1–28. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2024.2448217
• de Weerd, C. R., & Dung, L. (2025). How to live in the moment: The methodology and limitations of evolutionary research on consciousness. Cognitive Science 49(3). https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.70053
• Kirkeby-Hinrup, A., Fink, S.B., & Overgaard, Morten S (2025). The multiple generator hypothesis of consciousness. Neuroscience of Consciousness 2025(1), niaf035. https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niaf035
• Fink, S.B., & Ashby, B (2025). Gastronomy as Sensory Engineering. Gastronomica 25 (3): 69–71. https://doi.org/10.1525/gfc.2025.25.3.69
• Hellrigel-Holderbaum, M., & Dung, L. (2025). Misalignment or misuse? The AGI alignment tradeoff. Philosophical Studies. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02403-y
• Lundgren, B. 2025. The Risk of Surveillance Capitalism. Philosophy & Technology 38, 174. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-025-00983-5
• Lundgren, B. 2025. Review of Norbert Paulo and Lando Kirchmair, Moral Dilemmas Involving Self-Driving Cars: How to Regulate Them and Why Your Opinion Matters (New York: Routledge, 2025), x + 90pp, $37.49. Law and Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-025-09549-0
• Lundgren, B. (2025). Teaching Trade-offs in a Digital Ethics Course. Teaching Ethics, 24(2), 257–265. https://doi.org/10.5840/tej202579163
• Lundgren, B. & Stefánsson, H. Orri. (2025). Can the Normic de minimis Expected Utility Theory save the de minimis Principle?. Erkenntnis 90, 1255–1263. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00751-x
• Lundgren, B. (2025). Can Deepfakes Violate an Individual’s Moral Right to Privacy?. Ethical Theory Moral Practice. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-025-10514-y
• Lundgren, B. (2025). How social should AI be? Erkenntnis. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-025-01005-8
• Lundgren, B. On the Limits of the Data Economy: The Case of Autonomous Vehicles. Science and Engineering Ethics 31 (16). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-025-00540-5
• Lundgren, B. and Stefánsson, H. O. (2025). Can the normic de minimis decision theory save the de minimis principle? Erkenntnis. 90, 1255–1263. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00751-x
• Lundgren, B. (2025). God and the Possibility of a Moral Right to Privacy. Sophia. 64, 339–344. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-024-01057-3
• Lundgren, B. (2025). Hobbes’ Ship of Theseus: On the Limits of Surviving a Gradual Replacement of Parts. Theoria. e70013. https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.70013
• Müller, V. C. (2025). ‘Deep opacity undermines data protection and explainable artificial intelligence’, in M. Hähnel and R. Müller (eds.), Handbook for Applied Philosophy of AI (London: Wiley), 71-81.
• Müller, V. C. (2025). ‘Philosophy of AI: A structured overview’, in Nathalie A. Smuha (ed.), Cambridge handbook on the law, ethics and policy of Artificial Intelligence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 40-58.
• Müller, V. C. (2025). ‘Total surveillance – everybody watching everybody else’, in Henning Glaser and Pindar Wong (eds.), Governing the Future: Digitalization, Artificial Intelligence, Dataism (London: CRC Press – Routledge).
• Naeem, H. (2025). Teaching skills and intellectual virtues with generative AI. Episteme, 1-18. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2025.10089
• Naeem, H. (2025). AI and the complexity of pain. Philosophy and Technology 38(4), 1-21. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-025-00988-0
• Robertson, I. (2025). A Problem for Autonomous Know-How. Erkenntnis, 90(4), 1683-1691. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-024-00849-w
• Robertson, I. (2025) AI, Trust and Reliability. Philosophy & Technology. 38(3). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-025-00924-2
• Kirchhoff, M., Kiverstein, J. and Robertson, I. (2025): The Literalist Fallacy and the Free Energy Principle: Model-Building, Scientific Realism, and Instrumentalism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 76(3), 000-000. https://doi.org/10.1086/720861

2024

• de Weerd, C. R. (2024). A Credence-based Theory-heavy Approach to Non-human Consciousness. Synthese 203, 5. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04539-6
• Dewey, A. R. (2024). Balancing the evidential scale for the mental unconscious [commentary]. Philosophical Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2024.2316837
• Dewey, A. R. (2024). Anatomy’s role in mechanistic explanations of organism behaviour. Synthese 203, 137. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04534-x
• Dung, L. (2024). Is superintelligence necessarily moral? Analysis 84(4), 730–738. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anae033
• Dung, L. (2024). The argument for near-term human disempowerment through AI. AI & Society. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-024-01930-2
• Dung, L. (2024). Evaluating approaches for reducing catastrophic risks from AI. AI and Ethics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43681-024-00475-w
• Dung, L. (2024). Understanding artificial agency. The Philosophical Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqae010
• Dung, L. (2024). Preserving the normative significance of sentience. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 31(1–2), 8–30. https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.1.008
• Dung, L., & Kersten, L. (2024). Implementing artificial consciousness. Mind & Language 40(1), 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12532
• Balg, D., Bolte, L., Burkard, A., Constantin, J., Dung, L., Gottschalk, J., Gregor-Gehrmann, K., Guntermann, I., Schulz, K. (2024). “Ethische Fragen der Künstlichen Intelligenz” (Interview, Paper). Müller, Vincent C. (ed.), Göttingen: Philovernetzt. https://www.philovernetzt.de/ethische-fragen-der-kuenstlichen-intelligenz/
• Fink, S. B. (2024). On Acid Empiricism. In: The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophy and Psychoactive Drug Use (pp. 225-244). Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland.
• Repantis, D., Koslowski, M. & Fink, S.B. Ethische Aspekte der Therapie mit Psychedelika. Psychotherapie 69, 115–121 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00278-024-00710-z
• Fink, S.B. (2024). Wahrnehmung. In: Hoffmann-Kolss, V., Rathgeb, N. (eds) Handbuch Philosophie des Geistes. J.B. Metzler, Stuttgart. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-05416-6_34
• Caporuscio, C., Fink, S.B. (2024). Epistemic Risk Reduction in Psychedelic-Assisted Therapy. In: Current Topics in Behavioral Neurosciences. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, https://doi.org/10.1007/7854_2024_531
• Fink, S. B. (2024). How-tests for consciousness and direct neurophenomenal structuralism. Frontiers in Psychology 15. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1352272
• Lundgren, B. (2024), There is No Scarcity Problem. Philosophy & Technology 37, 130. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-024-00815-y
• Lundgren, B. (2024). Is a Moral Right to Privacy Limited by Agents’ Lack of Epistemic Control? Logos & Episteme 15(1): 83-87. https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20241516
• Lundgren, B. (2024). A new standard for accident simulations for self-driving vehicles: Can we use Waymo’s results from accident simulations? AI & Society 39: 669–673. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-022-01495-y
• Lundgren, B. (2024). Undisruptable or stable concepts: Can we design concepts that can avoid conceptual disruption, normative critique, and counterexamples? Ethics and Information Technology 26, 33. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-024-09767-5
• Lundgren, B., & Kudlek, K. (2024). What we owe (to) the present: Normative and practical challenges for strong longtermism. Futures 164, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2024.103471
• Andreotta, A.J., & Lundgren. B. (2024). Automated informed consent. Big Data & Society 11 (4), https://doi.org/10.1177/20539517241289439
• Lundgren, B., Catena, E., Robertson, I. Hellrigel-Holderbaum, M., Jaja, I.R., & Dung, L. (2024). On the need for a Global AI ethics. Journal of Global Ethics (RJGE). https://doi.org/10.1080/17449626.2024.2425366
• Müller, V. C. (2024), ‘Philosophie der Künstlichen Intelligenz: Ein strukturierter Überblick’, trans. Matthias Kettner, in Rainer Adolphi, et al. (eds.), Philosophische Digitalisierungsforschung: Verantwortung, Verständigung, Vernunft, Macht (Bielefeld: transcript Verlag), 345-70.
• Müller, V. C. and Hähnel, M.(2024), Was ist, was kann, was soll KI? Ein philosophisches Gespräch (Blaue Reihe; Hamburg: Felix Meiner).
• Porter, Ronald D./Shen, Minquian/Fabrigar, Leandre R./Seaboyer, Anthony (2024): Assessing Influence in Target Audiences that Won’t Say or Don’t Know How Much They Have Been Influenced. In: Éric Ouellet (Ed): Deterrence in the 21st Century: Statecraft in the information environment, University of Calgary Press, 36p.
  https://ucp.manifoldapp.org/read/deterrence-in-the-21st-century/section/097612c2-2005-4d56-b195-f2e418377755#_idParaDest-26
• Repantis, D., Koslowski, M. & Fink, S.B. (2024) Ethische Aspekte der Therapie mit Psychedelika. Psychotherapie 69, 115–121. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00278-024-00710-z
• Robertson, I. G. (2024). In Defence of Radically Enactive Imagination. Thought 11(4). https://doi.org/10.5840/tht202421525
• Hutto, D. D., & Robertson, I. (2024). What Comes Naturally?: Relaxed Naturalism’s New Philosophy of Nature. In Naturalism and Its Challenges (pp. 19-35). Routledge. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003430568-2/comes-naturally-daniel-hutto-ian-robertson
• Seaboyer, Anthony/Jolicoeur, Pierre (2024): L’intelligence artificielle russe comme outil de désinformation et de déception en Ukraine. In: Frédéric Côté et André Simonyi (Ed), Le Canada à l’aune du conflit en Ukraine, Québec. University of Laval Press. Link.
• Seaboyer, Anthony/Jolicoeur, Pierre (2024): The Evolution of China’s Information Exploitation of COVID-19. In: Éric Ouellet (Ed): Deterrence in the 21st Century: Statecraft in the information environment, University of Calgary Press, 28p. Link.

2023

• Dung, L. (2023). Tests of animal consciousness are tests of machine consciousness. Erkenntnis. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00753-9
• Dung, L. (2023). Current cases of AI misalignment and their implications for future risks. Synthese, 202(5), 138. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04367-0
• Dung, L. (2023). How to deal with risks of AI suffering. Inquiry, 1–29. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2023.2238287
• Hopster, J., Brey, P., Klenk, M., Löhr, G., Marchiori, S., Lundgren, B., Scharp, K. (2023). Conceptual Disruption and the Ethics of Technology. In van de Poel, I. et al. (eds.) Ethics of Socially Disruptive Technologies: An Introduction. Open Book Publishers, pp. 141–162.
• Lundgren, B. (2023). Ethical requirements for digital systems for contact tracing in pandemics: a solution to the contextual limits of ethical guidelines. In Macnish, K., Henschke, A. (eds.) The Ethics of Surveillance in Times of Emergency. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 169–185.
• Lundgren, B. (2023). Should we allow for the possibility of unexercised abilities? A new route to rejecting the poss-ability principle. Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2023.2250390.
• Lundgren, B. (2023). Is lack of literature engagement a reason for rejecting a paper in philosophy? Res Publica. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-023-09632-0
• Lundgren, B. (2023). Two notes on Axiological Futurism: The importance of disagreement and methodological implications for value theory. Futures 147, 103120. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2023.103120.
• Lundgren, B. (2023). In defense of ethical guidelines. AI & Ethics  3: 1013–1020. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43681-022-00244-7.
• Lundgren, B. (2023). An unrealistic and undesirable alternative to the right to be forgotten. Telecommunications Policy 47(1): 102446. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.telpol.2022.102446.
• Robertson, I. (2023) The unbearable rightness of seeing? Conceptualism, enactivism, and skilled engagement. Synthese 202, 173 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04385-y